🔬 Research & Frameworks

Frameworks & research for agentic payments.

The rubric we hold assurance layers to — and the threat research behind it. For payments engineers, protocol maintainers, and risk teams; public prior art and public tracker positions only.

APAF-1 — Agent Payment Assurance Framework

The evaluation framework behind every post in this series: seven assurance domains, a maturity model, and a standards cross-walk to FIDO AP2, OWASP, CSA ATSF, and PCI DSS. CC-BY-4.0 — copy, adapt, cite.

Why a valid mandate isn't a safe payment

Cryptographic validity answers was this artifact issued by who it claims? — nothing about whether the payment should happen. Three gaps sit between "signature verifies" and "safe to settle."

The replay window: consumption is not validity

Proof of delegation and proof of non-reuse are independent properties — each fails differently. A closed mandate can be perfectly signed and spent twice.

Evidence that survives the dispute

An evidence bundle that proves internal consistency proves exactly that. Closing the temporal gap requires anchoring the chain tip to a store neither party controls.

Agent identity is not agent intent

cnf binds a mandate to a key — proof of which key, not whose current intent. Why behavioral baselines are the missing signal.